A defining feature of modern organizations is that their members are mutually dependent on common but finite resources (March & Simon, 1958) . For this reason, organizations have been described as pools of shared resources for which individuals and groups compete (Kramer, 1991) .
When resources are abundant and sufficient to meet each members' needs, then conflict over resources is likely to be low (e.g., March & Simon, 1958) . However, if resources become scarce, then employees may perceive a sharp disjunction between their interests and those of other organizational members (Kramer, 1989c) . If left unattended, this situation can lead to intragroup competition and conflict that negatively impacts organizational functioning (Cyert & March, 1963) .
Over the years, scholars from many disciplines have been interested in how groups manage collective resources (e.g., Pfeffer & Moore, 1986) . Based on the results of field (Fort & Baden, 1981; Libecap & Johnson, 1981) and laboratory (Messick & McClelland, 1983) studies, it is now generally recognized that group members typically behave in one of two ways. In some groups, members act non-cooperatively or competitively by trying to maximize their own share of resources even if doing so harms the group as a whole. In other groups, they act cooperatively by voluntarily limiting consumption to conserve the shared resource. When shared resources become scarce, the literature suggests two competing predictions about which of these orientations will dominate the behavior of group members (Wayne & Rubinstein, 1992) . Some writers have suggested that an increase in scarcity tends to decrease cooperation by encouraging individuals to maximize their own outcomes at the expense of the group (Kramer, 1989c; Platt, 1973; Sahlins, 1965) . Others claim that eliminating scarcity will not automatically lead to greater cooperation (Astley, 1978; Moch & Pondy, 1977) . For example, it has been proposed that organizational slack, which is the opposite of scarcity, can encourage the pursuit of pet projects by company agents who show little regard for the interests of the principals they serve (cf., Jensen, 1993; Liebenstein, 1969; Nohria & Gulati, 1996) . Slack can also lead to suboptimal problem-solving behavior because decision makers are more willing to satisfice rather than search for the most efficient way to allocate resources (Simon, 1957) . What these divergent theoretical predictions suggest is that the relationship between scarcity and cooperation is contingent upon other factors.
The aim of this study is to reconcile competing predictions regarding the effects of scarcity on intragroup behavior. To address this question, the study adopts a social dilemma perspective (Kramer, 1989c) . The social dilemma has proven to be a useful metaphor for analyzing behavior in situations of conflict between multiple, interdependent actors who share a common resource (Dawes, 1980) . As such, it captures two distinctive features of organizational life: interdependence and conflict over limited resources. Based on this framework, we propose that the effects of scarcity on intragroup behavior are moderated by two factors: (1) the ability of group members to communicate and (2) the distribution of access to resources within the group. We tested these propositions using a simulated resource allocation task set in the context of a business decision. In the following sections, we describe the social dilemma perspective and the theoretical background for our predictions. We then present data that directly tests our hypotheses.
SOCIAL DILEMMAS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
A social dilemma occurs when individually rational decisions lead to collective disaster (Hardin, 1968; Dawes, 1980) . The social dilemma is essentially an extension of the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma to more than two parties. Social scientists have used the social dilemma paradigm to study how individuals and groups adapt to scarcity in a variety of group decision-making contexts (e.g., Platt, 1973; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987 ). Hardin's (1968) "Tragedy of the Commons" is the classic example of a social dilemma. In this example a group of herdsmen share a common pasture. Although it is in the interest of each herdsman to increase the size of his own herd, if all attempt to do so the commons will be overgrazed and everyone will be worse off than if they had not acted solely in their own self interest. Many organizational activities can be modeled using a commons analogy. Consider the following example drawn from a university setting.
A department is allocated a fixed sum of money to support faculty copying expenses during an academic term. Faculty are given free access to this shared resource with the expectation that it will be used only for work-related purposes. However, in the absence of surveillance and rule enforcement mechanisms, some faculty begin to make large numbers of personal copies. Although this has minimal long-term consequences when only a few faculty behave this way, as more faculty begin to use the resource to make personal copies, the departmental budget becomes prematurely exhausted and the benefits of the shared resource are lost to all.
The above example highlights the two defining properties of a social dilemma: (1) there is a dominant incentive for each individual to act in his or her own interest and (2) the result of each person acting upon the dominant choice is a suboptimal outcome for the group. Several solutions have been proposed to deal with the problems posed by social dilemmas. According to Messick and Brewer (1983) these solutions fall into one of two types. The first type can be brought about through uncoordinated changes in the behavior of group members. This class of solutions emphasizes processes such as communication that allow group members to "transform" (Kelley, 1983) a competitive situation into a cooperative one. The second type of solution requires a change in the structural features of the dilemma. Changing the payoffs for cooperation or altering the group's decision structure are examples of this second class of solutions.
If left alone to manage a shared resource, research shows that people generally fail to use the resource at an "optimal" level, where optimal has been defined as that level of use that would allow the resource to remain at its original size indefinitely (Komorita & Parks, 1994) . This supports the predictions of most economic models that in the absence of surveillance or coercive force, people will not achieve the levels of cooperation needed to maintain or support collective resources over time (Buchanan, 1968; Hardin, 1968; Heilbronner, 1974 ). Yet experimental research shows that some people do cooperate voluntarily, even when there are financial incentives to act otherwise (Dawes & Thaler, 1988) . Although the levels of cooperation are seldom optimal, they often exceed the levels predicted by orthodox economic models.
In the context of a two-party Prisoner's Dilemma, Axelrod (1984) has shown that the fundamental basis of cooperation is the likelihood of future interaction and the ability to retaliate against cheaters. This conclusion is the basis for the systematic strategy TIT-FOR-TAT, which is based on the principle of reciprocal altruism. Following this strategy, a player begins by cooperating and then chooses on trial t the response the other player has made on trial t-1. Based on an analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, Axelrod predicts that individuals and groups are least likely to cooperate when the future of the interaction is in doubt. This prediction has not, however, been consistently supported by data. As Dawes and Thaler (1988) point out, it is not uncommon to observe at least half of the subjects in laboratory studies cooperating even in single trial experiments. This suggests that the possibility of future interaction alone does not explain why people cooperate.
Turning to Axelrod's (1984) second observation that the ability to retaliate against cheaters can promote cooperation, we propose that this mechanism is less effective when more than two-parties are involved. In a multi-party context, it is difficult to play TIT-FOR-TAT or any other strategy based on reciprocal altruism. For example, if some members of a group cooperate on trial t while others defect, it is unclear what a player using TIT-FOR-TAT should do on the next trial. If a player retaliates by acting non-cooperatively, he or she may unfairly "punish" those who behaved cooperatively on the previous trial. For this reason, Axelrod's (1984) analysis seems most applicable to situations involving two parties. When multiple parties are involved, other factors may influence cooperation more strongly than the expectation of future interaction and the ability to retaliate against "cheaters."
We propose that resource scarcity is one factor that may significantly affect whether group members behave cooperatively rather than competitively in a social dilemma. However, we also postulate that the effects of scarcity are moderated by other variables. Accordingly, we tested the interactive effects on scarcity of prior communication and the distribution of access to the shared resource. However, before presenting our arguments supporting these interaction effects, let us first consider arguments for why scarcity might directly affect cooperation in a social dilemma.
The Effects of Scarcity
Scarcity is defined in the present study as an objective property of the situation. High scarcity exists when aggregate demand exceeds or nearly exceeds available supply. Conversely, low scarcity exists when the available surplus exceeds or begins to exceed aggregate demand. This definition implies that rather than being a discrete variable, scarcity varies along a continuum from high to low based on the degree to which demand exceeds available supply. When resources are shared, several parameters determine the level of scarcity faced by a group. Among these are the size of the resource pool, the number of group members using the resource, and the rate at which resources are being replenished or produced. Since these parameters define the objective interdependence structure of the payoff matrix of a social dilemma (Kramer, 1989c) , they can influence group members' decisions about how much to take from a common resource pool Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986 ).
Under conditions of high scarcity, Kramer (1989c) argued that group members will find it increasingly difficult to justify self-restraint because the future availability of the resource becomes more uncertain. As a result, each group member is more likely to seek a sure gain now rather than gamble on uncertain future gains. If everyone in the group acts in accord with this decision it will result in the rapid depletion of the shared resource . This analysis suggests that high scarcity will be associated with less cooperative responses. Using a game-theoretic framework, Goodin (1988) analyzed the effects of scarcity and reached a similar conclusion. Modeling decision making as being either cooperative or non-cooperative, Goodin (1988) argued that scarcity makes mean (noncooperative) games meaner, whereas a decline in scarcity makes mean games kinder (more cooperative). Since the dominant incentive for the individual in a social dilemma is non-cooperation (Dawes, 1980) , it fits Goodin's description of a non-cooperative game. Based on this analysis, we expect a direct, positive relationship between cooperation and declining scarcity, as the following hypothesis suggests:
H1a:
In a social dilemma, cooperation increases as resources become less scarce.
However, the main argument of this paper is that declining scarcity will not necessarily lead to increased cooperation. This is consistent with Astley's (1978) argument that the absence of scarcity may actually heighten conflict and competitiveness among group members by intensifying pre-existing rivalries and throwing the organization "up for grabs". It is also in accord with the views of some organizational economists who argue that the presence of slack resources contributes to inefficiency by allowing agents to pursue their own interests rather than acting in the interests of the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
As stated earlier, the competing theoretical predictions regarding the effects of scarcity can be reconciled by a contingency perspective. Based on prior theory and research, we propose two alternative hypotheses to the main effect predicted in Hypothesis 1a. The first alternative hypothesis predicts that the effect of scarcity on cooperation depends upon group members' ability to communicate prior to decision making.
Communication
There is compelling evidence that communication prior to decision making increases cooperation in many types of social dilemmas (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Edney & Harper, 1978; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988) . The direct effects of communication can be attributed to two forms of social influence: informational influence and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard 1955) . The first form of influence occurs because communication can be used to convey information and formulate strategies for how to solve the social dilemma. Through discussion, group members who have a better understanding of the dilemma may be able to provide less knowledgeable members with information that may convince them of the long-term benefits of cooperation. Communication can also be used to convey information about group norms and values. By providing group members with information about social norms governing the limits of acceptable competition and self-interested behavior, communication can facilitate the execution of strategies devised during discussion (Kramer, 1989c) .
We hypothesize that communication moderates the degree to which a decline in scarcity leads to cooperative behavior in a social dilemma. In the absence of communication, we postulate that an increase in the unit size of a shared resource will not necessarily produce a corresponding increase in cooperation, as Goodin's (1988) game-theoretic analysis suggests. Rather, what is needed to transform (Kelley, 1983) a competitive situation into a cooperative one is a process that: (a) allows group to recognize the benefits of cooperation and (b) conveys tacit norms that limit competition and individual payoff maximization (Kramer, 1989c ). This process is communication.
When group members are unable or unwilling to communicate, we predict that the group's ability to take full advantage of declining scarcity will be impaired. This will occur for two reasons. First, group members who recognize the long-term benefits of cooperation cannot exert informational influence on those who inaccurately perceive the structure of the social dilemma. Second, group members will be unable to exert normative influence by agreeing on socially defined rules that limit competitive behavior. Together, these conditions can prevent groups from effectively increasing cooperation in direct relation to an increase in the unit size of a shared resource. To test this argument, the following alternative to Hypothesis 1a is proposed. Communication is a process-based solution to a social dilemma. But competition and conflict over resources can also be managed through structural solutions designed to regulate group members' access to resources (Campbell, 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . Based on this argument, we theorize that another moderator of scarcity is the distribution of access to a shared resource.
Access to Resources
In organizations, members may be given varying levels of access to a collective resource. This implies that the allocation of resources is at least partially centralized. Returning to our earlier example of a university setting, it is not uncommon for a department chair to allocate resources like research funds or lab space among various faculty members. Under this system, a salient attribute of the structural arrangement is the degree to which access is equally or unequally distributed. A study by Aquino, Steisel, and Kay (1992) examined the effects of inequality in the distribution of resources on cooperative behavior in a social dilemma. They found that cooperation was greater when resources were distributed equally rather than unequally. However, other research has found either inconclusive or no significant evidence that the distribution of resources within a group affects cooperation (Marwell & Ames, 1979 : Samuelson & Messick, 1986 . Consistent with our contingency argument, we propose that these mixed empirical results are explained by the fact that structural inequality interacts with other variables to influence cooperation. Our prediction here is that inequality in access to resources moderates the effect of decreasing scarcity on cooperation.
We hypothesize that the positive relationship between declining scarcity and cooperative behavior is less likely to occur when access to the shared resource is unequally rather than equally distributed. Alternatively stated, we predict that when resources are scarce, fewer group members will voluntarily exercise restraint when access to the resource is unequally distributed. However, when access is equally distributed, group members will be more willing to act in a way that advances the interests of the group rather than just their own (i.e., they will be more cooperative). This prediction is based on an application of social psychological theories regarding the effects of resource inequalities on intragroup perceptions and motivations.
Several theorists (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Kabanoff, 1991; Kerr & Slocum, 1987) have argued that equal distributions of resources enhance feelings of group harmony, cooperation, and social responsibility. This in turn can promote cooperative responses to perceived scarcity (Kramer, 1989c) .
Unequal distributions, on the other hand, promote individualism and competitiveness (Deutsch, 1975) .
Such motivations are likely to intensify during periods of extreme scarcity leading to greater conflict and competition for resources (Booth, 1984; Wade, 1987) . Ultimately, this will be reflected in more selfinterested behavior (Sahlins, 1968) and the premature depletion of the shared resource. To test these predictions, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
METHOD Subjects
Subjects were 104 male and 104 female undergraduate business students from a State university located in a Southeastern city. Subjects participated in the study as part of a classroom exercise. Seventy-three percent of the sample (n=152) identified themselves as "Caucasian"; 15%
(n=32) as "African-American"; 9% (n=19) as "Asian"; and 1% (n=3) "Hispanic". Two subjects placed themselves in an "Other" category. The mean age of subjects was 24.5 (SD=5.2).
Design
The experiment was a 2 X 2 X 2 (Communication X Scarcity X Resource Distribution) design treating Resource Distribution as a nested (within subjects) factor. In this design, every subject made decisions under both resource distribution conditions. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four experimental roles resulting in thirteen four-person groups occupying each of four between subjects (Communication X Scarcity) cells.
Procedure
The simulation exercise was based on exercises used in previous studies of behavior in a social dilemmas (e.g., Rutte, et al., 1987) . Upon arriving in the classroom subjects were given background information and role playing instructions for a "resource management task".
Subjects were presented with identical information describing a business scenario. According to the scenario subjects were told to assume the roles of top managers in four business units (A, B, C, and D)
of a large corporation. These roles were randomly assigned to subjects prior to the experiment.
Subjects were told that each unit in the corporation operated independently and competed against the others for company resources and rewards. To support product development, units could request funds from the company's "R&D pool" (the shared resource) at the beginning of each fiscal year, which was operationalized as one experimental trial. Each business unit was allowed to request a limited amount of funds from the pool during each trial. Subjects made their requests in writing on a "Budget Request Form". The maximum amount that could be requested by all four units in any single trial was $160,000. The amount each individual unit could request, however, was systematically varied as part of the experiment.
The size of the resource pool was initially set at $160,000. Subjects were informed that after subtracting the sum of their funding requests in each trial, the resource pool would replenish itself by a predetermined factor. Thus, the size of the pool across trials varied as a function of how much money remained in the pool after subjects had made their budget request times the replenishment rate.
Subjects were told the experiment would continue for a randomly determined number of rounds, or until the sum of their requests in any trial equaled or exceeded the current size of the pool. Subjects
were not told actual number of rounds they would play in order to minimize end-game effects. In reality, all games were ended after six trials regardless of how much money remained in the pool.
Subjects were told that if the pool was overdrawn during any trial, the game would end and they would not receive the money they requested during that trial. The amount of money subjects accumulated over the six trials depended upon their individual decisions and ability to maintain the shared resource.
Subjects were told that their goal in the experiment was to "maximize the amount of money they accumulated across trials". To provide an incentive for subjects to behave realistically, they were told that their performance would be evaluated and the highest performer would be rewarded with a $10 gift certificate. High performance was defined as being able to accumulate the most money during the entire experiment compared to every subject who had been assigned the same role. Note that because we compared the relative performance of subjects within each role, they were not competing directly against the other members of their group. As a result, subjects who were randomly assigned to roles that gave them less access to the shared resource were not placed at any disadvantage and should have been just as motivated to compete for the $10 gift certificate as subjects assigned to high access roles.
Before beginning the actual trials, subjects went through a series of practice trials so they would see the relationship between total use, the replenishment factor, and the state of the resource.
After completing the practice trials, subjects answered a pre-questionnaire that asked them to provide demographic information and perceptions of social identity. The experiment did not begin until subjects completed the pre-questionnaire.
Subjects made all their decisions anonymously on the "Budget Request Form". A student facilitator was randomly assigned to each group. The facilitator's role was to record withdrawal decisions on a data sheet, compute the pool size, and provide verbal feedback regarding the current size of the pool. The facilitator was instructed to make sure that subjects did not communicate with one another during the decision trials. The facilitator did not provide subjects with any kind of feedback about other group members' decisions; hence, all decisions were made independently. At the end of each game, subjects completed a post-questionnaire.
Experimental Manipulations
Scarcity. Objective scarcity was manipulated by altering the replenishment factor. In the High Scarcity condition, the replenishment factor was 1.03, or an increase of 3% in pool size per trial; in the Low Scarcity condition the replenishment factor was 1.15, or an increase of 15% in pool size per trial.
The effect of varying the replenishment rate on the objective size of the resource pool is illustrated in Table 1 . Table 1 here
The Table shows that if a hypothetical group withdrew resources from the pool at a constant rate of $40,000 per trial, the pool would exhaust by the 5th trial at a 3% replenishment rate. At this time, the group would receive a total payoff of $160,000. However, at a 15% rate, the group would be able to use the resource for an additional trial and would accumulate a total payoff of $200,000. This example illustrates how objective scarcity decreases as the rate at which the resource pool replenishes itself increases, given identical levels of resource use.
Communication. In the No Communication condition, subjects were not allowed to communicate at all during the exercise. As soon as they formed their groups, subjects were instructed not to discuss their decisions for the duration of the task. In the Communication condition subjects were allowed to hold a 15 minute "consultation meeting" to discuss strategic issues for managing the resource. Once the 15 minutes elapsed, subjects were instructed to refrain from further discussion.
Resource distribution. All subjects made decisions in two resource distribution conditions, or games. The presentation of these games was counterbalanced to control for order effects. In each game, subjects were given identical "Information Sheets" that showed the maximum amount of money each manger of a business unit could request from the resource pool during each trial. Thus, subjects know exactly how much they could withdraw relative to other group members. After the first game was completed, subjects were given a new information sheet showing a different distribution pattern.
Subjects were told that the pool would return to its original size in the second game.
In the Equality condition, all business units (A, B, C, D) were allowed to withdraw a maximum of $40,000 from the resource pool per trial. In the Inequality condition, subjects playing the role of managers for business unit A could withdraw a maximum of $80,000, those managing B $40,000, those managing C $24,000, and those managing D $16,000. Subjects were told to make withdrawals in $1000 increments.
At the end of the experiment subjects were debriefed during a class discussion. Subjects in each role who accumulated the most profit were given their gift certificates at the end of the research project.
Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables measured cooperativeness at the group level: (a) the total amount of profit accumulated by the group in each game and (b) the number of rounds that the resource pool remained viable. The first dependent variable measures the group's ability to maximize collective benefit or joint gain. Several conflict theorists (e.g., Walton & McKersie, 1965; Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986 ) have argued that the concept of joint gain is a useful criteria for evaluating cooperativeness because it reflects the degree to which the interests of all parties are taken into account. The second variable measures the group's ability to preserve the shared resource over time. This measure bears some relation to the concept of an optimal use level, which we defined earlier as the ability to maintain the resource at its original size indefinitely (Komorita & Parks, 1984) . Logically, groups that preserve a resource longer can be said to exercise greater social restraint than those who quickly exhaust the 1 The f index was computed based on the following formula: f=(qç 2 /1-ç 2 ) (Cohen, 1988, p. 284) . resource. Moreover, by preserving the resource, groups can allow it to increase in size due to the replenishment factor, which in turn can yield a higher joint gain. The relationship between these two measures of cooperation is supported by their significant, positive correlation in the present study (r=.67, p<.001).
All data were collected and analyzed at the group level. This was done because the behavior of subjects after the first trial was influenced by the actions of other group members. Thus, observations at the individual level were not completely independent. By analyzing group level data the dependent variables could be treated as being truly independent, thus satisfying an important assumption of the multi variate techniques used to test our hypotheses.
RESULTS
We performed a 2 X 2 X 2 (Communication X Resource Distribution X Scarcity) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on each dependent variable to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. Several scholars (e.g., Cohen, 1977 Cohen, , 1994 Morrison & Henkel, 1970; Rozeboom, 1960; Thompson, 1992) have argued that researchers should pay more attention to effect sizes and report them routinely as part of the study findings rather than relying solely on significance tests as the basis for refuting the null hypothesis. Based on these recommendations, we present the results of both conventional tests of statistical significance and effect sizes (e.g., ç 2 s and f index 1 ) associated with each of the experimental treatments to provide a more comprehensive assessment of our results. Table 2 summarizes the results of the ANOVA on the dependent variable joint gain.
----------------------
Insert Table 2 here Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of this interaction.
Insert Figure 1 here
The figure shows that when scarcity was high, communication (M=$294, 923, SD=$45, 038) did not produce a significant increase in joint gain compared to no communication (M=$290, 308, SD=$45, 436) . However, when scarcity was low, cooperation increased when group members were allowed to communicate (M=$387,077, SD=$79,389) prior to decision making as compared to when no communication (M=$320,000, SD=$50,583) was allowed. Since lower order effects cannot be accurately interpreted in the presence of higher order effects (Aiken & West, 1991) , the significant two-way interaction supports our prediction that the effects of scarcity on cooperation are contingent on other factors. In this case, the ability of group members to communicate prior to decision making.
Hypothesis 1c predicts that resource distribution also moderates the effect of scarcity. As Table 2 shows, this hypothesis was not supported for the dependent variable joint gain. According to Cohen, (1977) an f index value of .10 indicate a small effect size; a value of .25 indicates a medium effect size;
and a value of .40 or higher indicates a large effect size. Based on these standards, Table 2 reveals that communication had a large effect on joint gain, while scarcity and the communication by scarcity interaction had medium effect sizes. Table 3 summarizes the results of the ANOVA on the number of rounds the pool remained viable.
Insert Table 3 here
Consistent with our earlier finding, communication had a significant main effect on cooperation, F(1,48)=16.83, p<.001. However, there was no evidence that a decline in scarcity enhanced groups' ability to preserve the shared resource. This result failed to support Hypothesis 1a. We also failed to replicate the communication X scarcity effect obtained in our earlier analysis. We did, however, find modest support for Hypothesis 1c. Specifically, the ANOVA showed a marginally significant resource distribution X scarcity interaction, F(1,48)=3.61, p=.06. The pattern of the interaction is depicted in Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2 here Figure 2 shows that in the high scarcity condition, whether groups had equal (M=3.3, SD=1.9) or unequal (M=3.8, SD=1.9) access did not significantly affect their ability to preserve the resource.
However, in the low scarcity condition, allowing equal access (M=4.6, SD=2.0) allowed groups to preserve the resource longer than when access was unequally distributed (M=3.9, SD=1.9). This pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 1c. Examination of the effect size indices shows that communication had a large effect on the number of rounds the pool remained viable. Scarcity and the resource distribution x scarcity interaction had medium sized effects. A comparison of the effect sizes obtained from the analysis of the two dependent variables suggests that communication had a stronger effect on both joint gain and the group's ability to maintain the resource over time than the distribution of resources.
DISCUSSION
The main finding of this study was that communication moderates the effect of scarcity on cooperation when operationalized in terms of joint gain. We also found some evidence that inequality in the distribution of access to a shared resource moderates the effect of scarcity on the group's ability to preserve resource over time. Lastly, the study provided additional support for the already robust finding that communication prior to decision making increases cooperation in a social dilemma.
Theoretical Explanations and Contributions
There have been competing theoretical predictions regarding the effects of scarcity on intragroup behavior in organizations. Whereas some writers have argued that scarcity promotes an increase in competitive behavior (Kramer, 1989c; Platt, 1973; Sahlins, 1965) , others contend that a reduction in scarcity may not necessarily increase cooperation (Astley, 1978; Moch & Pondy, 1977; Jensen, 1993) . In this study, we adopted a social dilemmas perspective to examine these competing predictions in a group context where members where mutually interdependent. Under these conditions, we proposed that the effect of scarcity is contingent upon several factors: the ability of group members to communicate and the distribution of access to resources within the group. The data provided the strongest support for the moderating effect of prior communication.
That a decline in scarcity resulted in a significant increase in joint gain when groups were allowed to communicate compared to when no communication was allowed suggests that scarcity does not, by itself, provide an adequate explanation for cooperative behavior in a social dilemma. Many theoretical frameworks have been used to explain cooperation and non-cooperation in groups. We suggest that the influence of scarcity is perhaps best understood from the perspective of structural models (Blau, 1974) . Structural models generally explain cooperation and its absence in terms of aggregated conditions of the system in which cooperation occurs (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995) .
Consistent with this perspective, we argued that scarcity influences group members' decisions by determining the objective interdependence structure of the payoff matrix in a social dilemma (Kramer, 1989c) . However, as our data showed, a change in objective scarcity did not produce a direct, monotonic effect on joint gain. Indeed, when no communication was allowed, we found that a decline in scarcity did not significantly increase joint gain.
This finding suggests that an alternative explanation is needed to account for the emergence of cooperation under varying levels of scarcity. Based on the fact that communication can be conceptualized as a procedural mechanism that facilitates group members' use of informational and normative influence, perhaps a more appropriate framework is one based on social modeling theories (Bandura, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . These theories provide a potentially richer explanation of how intragroup processes contribute to the formation of norms of cooperative behavior through learning and innovation. Unfortunately, the present data do not allow us to explore in great detail how groups in the low scarcity condition capitalized on communication (i.e., what kind of strategies were pursued) because we did not record the content of communication. What the behavioral data do suggest, though, is that future studies should focus more explicitly on the content of discussion and the learning process that may have occurred through the mechanism of communication.
We found some evidence that level of access moderates the relation between scarcity and cooperation. In contrast to communication, this effect was centered on the group's ability to preserve the resource rather than on joint gain. The predicted interaction between scarcity and level of access was based on social psychological theories of how individual motivations and perceptions are influenced by inequality. We proposed that a decline in scarcity would lead to increased cooperation when access to resources was distributed equally rather than unequally. The data provided some support for this hypothesis. As Figure 2 showed, the pattern of the interaction between scarcity and access to resources was consistent with Aquino, et al.'s (1992) finding that an equal distribution of resources leads to greater cooperation than an unequal distribution. However, we extended this result
by showing that the pattern emerges only when resources were less scarce. One implication of this finding is that a more egalitarian distribution of resources may not promote cooperation, as some writers (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Kabanoff, 1991) suggest, unless resources are perceived as being sufficient to meet group members' needs.
Limitations of the Study
This study has several limitations that deserve comment. First, the moderated effects of communication and access to resources did not receive consistent support across both dependent measures. Moreover, the predicted interaction between scarcity and access to resources failed to reach statistical significance at .05 on either dependent measure. However, this finding by itself should not lead us to reject the hypothesis entirely. A number of scholars (e.g., Cohen, 1977 Cohen, , 1994 Morrison & Henkel, 1970; Rozeboom, 1960; Thompson, 1992) have argued persuasively that there are a number of problems associated with the use of null hypothesis significance testing as the sole basis for assessing a study's findings. According to Cohen (1977) , researchers should also consider effect sizes. In this study, we reported the results of both conventional statistical significance tests and effect sizes. It was found that the effect sizes of the predicted interactions fell within the middle range of standards proposed by Cohen (1977) , which leads us to suggest that there are reasonable grounds for concluding that our theoretical predictions received some empirical support. Of course, the best way to assess the validity of our theoretical propositions is through replication (Cohen, 1977) .
A second limitation of the study was alluded to earlier; namely, that we did not gather data on the content of the discussions among group members prior to decision making. It is conceivable that such data would provide greater insight into how group members may have exerted either normative or informational influence on other members and if, in turn, this affected their behavioral responses to declining scarcity. At present, we can only infer the use of such influence tactics based on the outcomes obtained by groups. Although there is reason to suspect that such influence processes occurred, the absence of data on what was actually said in groups seriously restricts our ability to draw conclusions regarding this process in the present study.
A third limitation of the study is that the levels of the independent variables represent fixed rather than random factors. That is, the levels of the independent manipulations were selected arbitrarily and systematically to represent the entire population of treatment conditions that may be of interest. Although this is the most common approach taken in a situation where the number of potential levels at which a variable may be manipulated is exceedingly large, a limitation of this approach is that it restricts the generality of the results to those treatment effects observed within a particular set of conditions. Alternatively stated, it may be that had we selected a different level of scarcity, or varied the degree of inequality in access, we would have found different effects from those we observed.
Notwithstanding these limitations, Keppel (1982) points out that the choice of using fixed rather than random factors must be guided by several considerations. The first is whether or not the full range of the stimulus dimension can be represented in an experiment. Clearly, it was impossible to represent the entire range of scarcity or inequality in a single design. Consequently, the next consideration is choosing levels that are expected to produce a reasonably large difference between adjacent levels.
Based on the significant main effects for the independent manipulations found in our study, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that the levels of the independent variables chosen did produce differences across treatment groups. Finally, had we used a random selection procedure to arbitrarily choose levels of the independent variable, there is no guarantee that important points along the dimensions of these variables would be represented in the experiment. In sum, given the limitations of the fixed factor procedure used in the present research, future research should attempt to vary the levels of scarcity and inequality to identify whether there may be critical points of inflection. For example, some research suggests that the effects of slack on organizational innovation follows a curvilinear pattern (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) . A similar pattern may describe the relationship between scarcity and cooperation.
Organizational Implications
It has been suggested that slack plays a vital role in resolving latent goal conflict between political coalitions in organizations, while scarcity can increase internal conflict and discord (Cyert & March, 1963) . We used a social dilemma framework to model a situation in which the motive to maximize individual interest "dominates" the motive to maximize group interest. As a result, the findings of the study offer several practical implications for how groups in organizations may capitalize on transitional periods from high to low scarcity and vice versa.
In organizations, the transition from low to high scarcity often occurs so gradually that it may be imperceptible to some group members. For example, there has often been much uncertainty even among experts about the severity of resource crises or even whether resource shortages actually exist (cf. Hardin, 1968 versus Marice & Smithson, 1987 . Similarly, it may not always be obvious when organizational resources have become more abundant. If this assumption is correct, then individuals may fail to accurately perceive changes in the objective payoff structure of organizational social dilemmas which, in turn, can lead them to act as if resources were still scarce. In other words, they would continue to be motivated to maximize present gains because they perceive the future viability of the resource to be threatened.
Based on the preceding analysis, one implication of the present study is that organizations should institute procedural mechanisms that allow group members to develop strategies for taking maximal advantage of declining scarcity. Face-to-face communication should be a prominent feature of such mechanisms. However, simply allowing members to communicate without also providing accurate information about the objective state of the resource may limit its effectiveness. From this perspective, the role of managers as information gatekeepers becomes relevant.
A single person controlling the information in an organization can affect decisions by allowing certain information to flow through channels (Pettigrew, 1979) . Similarly, O'Reilly (1980) argued that communication within an organization is selectively filtered by those controlling its flow. What these observations suggest is that the effectiveness of communication may be largely dependent on the type of information available to group members. In this study, all group members were given accurate and identical information about the rate at which resources were replenished and how much of the resource was available for use. In real organizations, however, accurate information may not always be available.
This suggests that an important question for future research is to examine how information gatekeepers in organizations might influence perceptions of scarcity and the subsequent levels of cooperation among group members.
When face-to-face communication is not feasible, then organizations may have to rely on structural mechanisms to capitalize on declining scarcity. Consistent with structural solutions, our findings suggests that providing members with more equal access to the shared resource can promote increased conservation during periods of low scarcity. However, recognizing that the empirical support obtained for both the direct and interactive effects of the resource distribution manipulation was not particularly strong, it may be that other structural mechanisms are more effective. One possible structural mechanism would be to implement a hierarchical solution that facilitates coordination and cooperation among group members. A common hierarchical solutions is the election of a leader to make the decision for the group (Samuelson & Messick, 1986) . Based on the hierarchical solution, it would seem reasonable for organizations to partially or perhaps fully centralize some resource allocation decisions, particularly when a group has shown a history of mismanaging a shared resource. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Replenishment Rate  ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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